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Breaches of lease between exercise of option to renew and 
expiry of lease in Queensland 
Intoduction 
The decision of Greppo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131   
illustrates a defect in s 128 of the Property Law Act 1974(Qld) which gives a 
right to a lessee to apply for relief against forfeiture against loss of a right to 
exercise an option to renew. The defect arises because the legislation does not 
adequately deal with breaches that occur after the exercise of the option but 
before the expiry of the lease. Most commercial leases of all kinds have a 
standard provisions, as the lease in this case, as a conditions of the exercise of 
the option to renew that the lessee will have given notice of exercise within the 
time specified to the lessor and will have up to the date of expiry of the lease 
paid all rent and observed all  lessee’s covenants. The difficulties occur because 
invariably an option must be exercised before the expiry of the lease  when a 
lessee may not be in breach of the lease but may later prior to the  expiry of the 
lease fall into breach. As this decision indicates,at least in Queensland, that the 
lessee who desires to challenge the lessor’s right to enforce those conditions  
can neither seek relief under s 128 against forfeiture of the right to exercise the 
option ,or indeed, under s 124 of the Property Law Act 1974  to preserve the 
agreement for lease brought about by the otherwise regular exercise of the 
option to renew. The decision cries out for legislative reform along the lines of s 
133E of the Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW) which was amended in 2001 to meet 
this contingency. 
Facts 
A lessee  gave proper written notice of exercise of option on 5 November 2012 
in respect of a three year lease which expired on 13 May 2013 Notices to 
Remedy Breaches of Covenant had been served on the lessee during October 
and December 2012 and August 2013 (although the lease had expired on 30 
May 2013) .In October 2013, the lessors ,apparently believing that a lease 
existed gave  notice to the lessee to deliver possession. At first instance, the 
lessee successfully contested the fact that there were any breaches that would 
deprive them of the right to exercise  option to renew although ,in respect of two 
alleged breaches ,(subletting without consent and failing to keep the premises 
clear of termites) the Court of Appeal found the breaches proven.However, the 
lessors failed to give any “prescribed notice” pursuant to s 128(4) during the 
period of 14 days after the purported exercise of the option. 
Arguments of parties 
The lessees alleged that the lessors could therefore not rely upon any of the 
breaches stipulated in the Notices to Remedy Breach to deny them the right to 
renew the lease. The lessee argued that the “purported exercise”  of the option 
to renew effectively occurred in two stages, the first stage was the  giving the 
written notice within the period the lease ,and the second stage was the ensuring    
that the lessee had not breached the lease between the giving of the notice of 
exercise and the expiry of the lease. Only after the expiry of the lease could it be 
determined that all preconditions of successful exercise had been met. In respect 
of the breaches complained about by the lessor, the lessee argued that no 
“prescribed notice” had bene served with 14 days after the expiry of the lease. 
Alternatively, the lessee argued that as an equitable lease had come into 
existence upon the exercise of then option to renew, pending the 
commencement of the  new term, the lessee could seek relief against forfeiture 
under s 124 of the Property Law  Act 1974   relying upon the fact that “lease” 
for the purposes of that section, included by virtue of  the extended  definition in 
s 123 included “an agreement for lease where the lessee had become entitled to 
have the lease granted.” 
The lessors argued firstly , that s 128 did not apply  to breaches  which occurred 
after the “purported exercise “ of the option, and ,secondly, that s 124 could not 
apply to relieve the lessees against a possible forfeiture of the agreement for 
lease as  one of the necessary preconditions (the maintenance of no breaches up 
until expiry of the lease) had not in this case been satisfied  and that the 
agreement for lease could not be described as being one “ where the lessee had 
become entitled to have the lease granted.” 
Analysis 
Holmes JA delivering the main judgment (with whom Morrison JA and 
Douglas J agreed on this issue) analysed a number of conflicting New South 
Wales authorities on an identical section in the New South Wales Conveyancing 
Act 1919 (prior to an amendment in 2001 clarifying this doubt)which directly 
applied to s 128 at present. Her Honour came to a number of conclusions in 
respect of the interpretation of s 128 
Firstly,  Holmes JA found that the expression “purported exercise” of the option 
to renew occurred  at the time the notice of exercise was given. Her Honour 
held that the notice gave notice of intention by the lessee to take up the 
entitlement of a new lease but such a right was subject to the precondition that 
the lessee was not in breach of their obligations until the expiry of the lease. In 
other words, the option was not exercised in two stages, but only one stage and 
the issue of a new lease was subject to a precondition (no breaches to expiry of 
the lease) which may or may not be met at the expiry of the lease. Any 
“prescribed notice “ under s 128(4) had to be given by the lessor within 14 days 
of the giving of the notice “purporting “ to exercise the option. 
Secondly, Holmes JA then turned her attention the status of the alleged 
“agreement for lease” which , according to the lessee, came into effect between 
the date of exercise of the option and the expiry of the lease. In two Queensland 
decisions (Eighteenth Ashlaw Nominees Pty Ltd v Vadelly Pty Ltd unreported 
,Supreme Court of Queensland, 4864/1986,Williams J and Jack Butler & Staff  
v Black (1991) ANZ Conv R 186)  the status of an agreement for lease had been 
raised but not concluded as being necessary for decision.In any event ,Holmes 
JA found that  as the court had found that there had been breaches of lease up 
until the expiry of the lease, given the wording of the option clause, the lessor 
was not obliged to grant a new lease.at the time of exercise of the option and 
until the expiry of the lease, given the failure of the precondition of no breaches, 
the lessee’s rights could not be described as being based upon “an agreement for 
lease whereby the lessee was entitled to have a new lease granted”  in 
conformity with the extended definition of “ lease” in s 123 of the Property Law 
Act 1974.Therefore, the lessee could not avail itself of a right to relief against 
forfeiture under s 124 . 
Conclusion 
The Court found that the lessee was not entitled to exercise the option to renew 
because of  the breaches of covenants after the “purported  exercise” by delivery 
of the notice and therefore s 128 did not apply. As no agreement for lease came 
into existence  sufficiently to satisfy  the definition of “lease” under s 123, the 
lessee could not take advantage of the right s afforded  under s 124.The lessee 
was found to be in possession under a holding over provision in the original 
lease which made the lessee a monthly tenant from the date of expiry of the 
lease. 
 This decision clarifies the position in Queensland in respect of the application of 
both sections 123,124 and 128 of the Property Law Act 1974 with respect to 
post notice breaches. It is not a happy story for a lessee. It leaves a lessee in this 
position unable to test whether or not the breaches after the purported exercise 
of an option to renew are of sufficient gravity to bring about a forfeiture of the 
new lease. By characterising the condition that the lessee not be in breach of the 
lease until expiry of the term as a precondition to taking up the new lease, it 
takes consideration of those breaches out of the statutory framework of 
protection. The position was clarified in New South wales by an amendment to 
s 133E (1) and (3) of the Conveyancing Act 1991(NSW) by the Land Titles 
Legislation Amendment Act 2001, Schedule 1.This amendment requires a lessor 
seeking to rely upon post exercise of option  breaches to terminate a lease to 
give a “prescribed notice” in respect of those breaches so that their seriousness 
can be tested to determine whether or not they might lead to a forfeiture of the 
new lease. 
It is respectfully suggested that such an amendment should be considered in 
Queensland as without it the lessee remains, somewhat irrationally, in the 
difficult and virtually irremediable situation  between exercise of the option and 
expiry of the lease. 
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